Abstract
adequate security protocols are needed to facilitate contract signing and guarantee fairness to all the parties involved.
This paper presents a novel contract signing DSA-CS protocol, in which the exchanged signatures are based on DSA. DSA-CS protocol provides strong fairness for the exchange of signatures, and enables automated dispute resolution with the help of an off-line STTP. The participation of the STTP in the protocol is frunsparent, i.e. even in cases when the STTP has to be invoked, signatures it recovers are identical to those generated by the original signers. The confidentiality of the contract document and the exchanged signatures is maintained throughout the protocol execution -neither a party external to the contract signing process nor the STTP can obtain any information related to these items. The protocol is designed in such a way that only the initiator of the protocol needs to actively take part in (possible) dispute resolution, while the responder only has a passive role. This property enables to minimize the communication overhead on the responder and to safeguard him against possible denial-of-service attacks by malicious senders. In order to improve the protocol's efficiency, measures are taken to reduce the number of computationally expensive cryptographic operations, and, in comparison with the related protocols, our protocol is more efficient.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the related work. Section 3 states the requirements DSA-CS protocol is aimed at satisfymg, and the notation and the assumptions used in the protocol design. Section 4 presents the design of the protocol's main building block -the VRES cryptographic primitive, and Section 5 presents the formal description of DSA-CS protocol. The security of the protocol is analysed in Section 6, and the protocol is evaluated and compared to related work in Section 7. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 8.
Related work
A number of protocols have been proposed up to date to achieve fair contract signing. Historically, the protocol I design has evolved fi-om two-party approach (i.e. without the involvement of any trusted third party (TTP)), to the TTP-based approach (where fairness is guaranteed by the involvement of a TTP).
The two-party protocols go as early as 1980s. Protocols [6, 111 and, more recently, [lo, 151 are based on gradual exchange of small parts of the items to ensure that the exchange of the items occurs pseudo-simultaneously. This is achieved by having the parties release their secret items bit-by-bit in an interleaving manner -one party releases a bit o f his item (together with the prdof of correctness of the bit), and in return receives a bit of his counterpart's item (and its proof of correctness), and this process continues until both of them have received and released all the bits. Obviously, to achieve fairness, both items must be o f the same length. The gradual secret release has been applied in the design of protocols for contracts singing in the following way: each party randomly generates a secret, and declares that he is committed to the previously agreed contract if his counterpart knows his secret. Then the parties engage in the gradual secret release protocol to fairly exchange their secrets.
A major disadvantage associated w i t h two-party approach is that a large number of exchange rounds is needed to ensure an acceptable level of fairness, thus the level of traffic generated into the underlying network is high. Additionally, gradual secret release protocols require that participating parties have approximately equal computational power in order to guarantee fairness. Otherwise, the party with stronger computational capabilities can launch a brute-force attack after receiving the first several bits, and work out the remaining bits of his counterpart's secret. Although reasonably convincing in theory, this approach is too impractical for real life applications. In addition, protocols of this kind provide no guarantees of the quality of secrets exchanged, i.e. parties can fairly exchange bits of their secrets, but only at the end of the protocol to discover that the received bits are gibberish.
In order to overcome these weaknesses, a TTP is introduced in the protocols to assist the participants with the exchange and achieving fairness. In early TTP-based protocols, the TTP is on-line, i.e. it mediates every exchange process, even when participating parties are not attempting to cheat [7, 12, 14, 191 . Basically, both parties send their items to the TTP, which verifies the correctness of the items and forwards them to the rightful recipients. The TTP is also responsible for generating and storing security sensitive transactional records, making it a focal point of security attacks. In on-line TTP-based approach, a protocol cannot be performed without the TTP, making it a potential communicational and performance bottleneck and susceptible to denial-of-service attacks. In addition, as all the exchanged data is exposed to the on-line TTP, it has to be hlly and unconditionally trusted. Clearly, it is desirable to design protocols where the involvement of and security/storage requirements placed on the TTP are reduced.
In Encrypted Signature (VRES) [2-5, 9, 13, 171. In these protocols, merely by looking at the exchanged signatures, it is not possible to decide whether or not the TTP has intervened in the protocol execution. The VRES represents an encrypted signature such that a VRES receiver is assured that it indeed contains the correct signature, without obtaining any information about the signature itself (verifiability property). At the same time, the VRES receiver is assured that a designated TTP can decrypt the VRES, if a dispute arises (recoverability property). In this way, the VRES receiver is convinced that it is secure for him to release his signature first during an exchange process, as the agreed third party can recover the original signature fiom the VRES, should the VRES sender refuse to send his original signature later on. This paper proposes a novel and efficient method for the VRES. Unlike protocols [2-5, 91, which are using interactive zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs for the VRES verification, in our VRES scheme no on-line interactions between the participants are required. A more detailed comparison with the related VRES-based contract singing protocols is presented in Section 7.
Preliminaries

Requirements
The design of the DSA-CS protocol is aimed at satisfying the following requirements.
Strong fuirness [I] (S2): At the end of an exchange, if one party has obtained the other party's signature or can obtain it with the assistance of a third party, then the other party has obtained this party's signature or can obtain it with the assistance of the third party.
Confidentiality (S2): A contract to be signed and the corresponding signatures should not be disclosed to other parties, including the third party.
Limited role of the third party (S3): The protocol should employ a STTP, rather than a TTP, and reduce security and storage requirements placed on the STTP. As defined in [12] , STTP differs &om TTP as it may misbehave on its own, but will not collude with any party involved in the exchange, whereas the TTP is expected not to misbehave at all and the level of trust placed in the TTP is unconditional. 
Notation
Signi@) expresses the signature of a party Pi on a data item x using DSA signature scheme. (xi, yi) denotes Pi's DSA private/public key pair. h(x) is a strong-collision-resistant one-way hash function, such as SHA-1.
x, y denotes the concatenation of data item x and y. 
Assumptions
DSA-based VRES scheme
The VRES scheme comprises the following four stages:
(1) initialisation stage, (2) VRES generation, (3) VRES verification, and (4) VRES'recovery. We assume that party P b generates the VRES for his ordinary DSA signature (rb, sb), party Pa performs the VRES verification, and party p, the VRES recovery. We recall that to verify P b ' s DSA signature (rb, &), one should check that the following equation holds:
(1)
Initialisation stage. During the initialisation stage, parties P b and Pl agree on a one-time shared secret key wbl, which should be used for one protocol execution only (the reason for this will be explained later). The related public key Zbr is defined as Zbr = g Wbr mod p. PI issues a certificate y b , zbb hbt, &). Here, P b represents Pb's identity, y b is Pb's ordinary DSA public key, zbl is P b ' s newly generated public key, and hbl is defined as hhl = (h(xl, yb)"X wbl) mod p , where xl is Pl's private key. By including hbl in the c b , , PI has no need to safe-keep the secret key Wbr, as Pl can c b l is P i s signature on all the items from the certificate, i.e.
= Sign,(Pb, y b , zb,, hbl). The purpose of this certificate is to establish a secret key wbl between P b and PI, which is to be used by P b to generate the VRES, and by Pf to recover Here, VI = (rbXg(zb"h)modp) mod q = (rbxg((gw')'b)mod p) mod q = ( r b Xg((g4)w)mod p ) mod q = (rb mod p) mod q, so VI can be ''decrypted'' to recover rb either using Pb's private key x b or using the secret key Wbr, shared between P b and P,.
The purpose of verification (a) is to verify that Pl has indeed issued the certificate c b l for p b ' s public key Zbr, and that it knows the corresponding secret key Wbp The purpose of verification (b) is to convince Pa that P b ' s VRES (vI, v2, v3) indeed contains the correct signature ( r b , sb), and that number Zbtb = ybWbt mod p was used in the computation of (vI, v2, vJ. Hash value h(C) is also included in the verification to ensure that the signature is computed on the correct document C. The equivalence of equation (2), used VRES recovery. In order for P, to recover Pb's signature ( r b , sb) &om VRES (vI, v2, vj), P, fust has to derive the shared private key Wbr from f b ' s certificate c b l using its private key x,, i.e. wbr = (h(x,, )+,) x hbt) mod q, and then uses Wbr to recover rb from V I as rb = ( V , x g-(Yb%') modp) mod q. The other part of f b ' s signature can then be VRES security. The security of the VRES scheme can be discussed in relation to two issues -firstly, is it possible to convert the VRES (vI, v2, vj) into Pb's normal signature secondly, it is possible for P b to forge the VREs and trick
P, into accepting it?
In order to convert the VRES into the ordinary signature, one should either know P b ' s private key xb or private key wbt shared between f b and PI and use it to compute the number Zbtb = ybwb' mod p and then use this number to recover r b from VI or sb f?om vj. However, computing private keys xb and wbr from the corresponding public keys y b and zbf is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem.
Should it be possible to forge the VRES, P b could generate another signature (q,', sb') # (rb, sb) on a different document C, and use it to create V a s ' and cheat P, into accepting it as a verifiable and recoverable encryption of signature (rb, sb) on document C. This would, however, mean that the equation (2) holds, and, since equations (2) and (1) Note that it is crucial for the security of the scheme that the secret key wb( is not reused. Should, for instance, party P b reuse the key pair (wbt, zbl) for two exchange sessions with party Pa, it would enable Pa to compute the number VRES and compute his signature from the second session.
Party P b should obtain multiple certificates c b , from P,, and discard the used certificate at the end of each session.
Zb;';b after the first Session, and then use it to ''brew P b ' s
DSA-CS protocol
This section presents the formal description of the DSA-CS protocol, which consists of two protocols -the signature exchange and the signature recovery protocol. The signature exchange protocol handles the case of a normal exchange between parties Pa and f b without P1's involvement. The recovery protocol deals with cases when the exchange protocol has failed to complete successfully, during which Pl is invoked to recover the receipt and restore fairness.
Signature exchange protocol
The exchange protocol is performed according to the following steps: Step (El): P, produces partial encryption of his DSA signature (r,, s,), denoted as @ I , pz), as follows:
and transfers the itemspl,pz, and r, to Pb.
Step ( ( p,h(C) xp2' modp) mod q = r,.
If this verification is negative, f b may ask P, to re-send message (El) or may terminate the protocol execution. OtheMrise, P b is ensured that Po's partial signature encryption (pI, p2) contains the correct sa, and f b produces VRES (vl, v2, vj) together with his authorisation token atb.
atb is defined as ph's signature on items c b t , vl, p1 and Pa, i.e. a t b = Signb(Cbl, vI, p l , Pa), and a t b represents f b ' s conditional authorisation stating that Pf can recover rb from vI, which will enable Pa to derive s b from v2, if and only if P, provides P, with an item sa, such that g"-' mod p = p I .
P h transfers his VRES (VI, v2, vj), authorisation a f b , and Chr to Pa.
Step (E3): P, performs the VRES and checks the correctness of authorisation by verifying p b ' s signature a f b .
If either of these verifications is negative, f, may ask P b to re-send message (E3) or terminate the protocol execution.
Otherwise, P, sends the other part of his signature sa to f b .
Step (E4): Upon receipt of sa fiom Pa, Pb verifies the correctness of Po's signature (ra, sa). If this verification fails, Pb may ask Pa to re-send message (E4) or terminate the protocol execution. Otherwise, Pb sends rb to P,,. Upon receipt of rb, Pa uses it to derive sb. Pa then verifies the correctness of Pb's signature (rb, sb). If this verification is positive, the exchange process is completed successfullyparties Pa and Pb have obtained each other's signature on document C. If this verification is negative, or Pa fails to receive rb from Pb, Pa may initiate the signature recovery protocol.
The Signature Recovery Protocol
party Pa only, and is executed as follows:
The signature recovery protocol can be invoked by Step (R2): P, sends rb to Pa.
Step (m): pl forwards Sa t0 Pb.
6:Protocol analysis
The security of DSA-CEGD protocol is dependant on that of its main cryptographic building block -the VRES, which was discussed in Section 4. The compliance with the security requirements specified in Section 3.1 can be discussed as follows. Strong fairness (Sl): Suppose that Pb has obtained Pa's signature (rb, s,,), i.e. Ph has received the correct ra in step (El) and sa in step (E3) or fkom P, in step (R3). In this case, Po must have received the correct VRES (vi, v2, v3) in step (E2). Consequently, Po w i l l obtain rb fiom pb in step (E4), or from P, in step (R2). Pa can then use it to derive Sb fiom vz to obtain Pb's complete signature (sb, rb). Similarly, suppose that pa has obtained Pb's complete Signature (sb, rb), i.e. Pa has received the correct items in step (E2) and rb in step (E4) or from P, in step (R2). This implies that Pb has received the correct ra in step (El) and s, in step (E3) or from p, in step (R3). Therefore, Pb can obtain Pa's complete signature (sa, rJ.
Data confidentiality (S2): Since communication between parties Pa and Pb is carried out through a confidential channel, the exchanged data is not exposed to any outsiders. In addition, document C is not used in the recovery process and P, only deals with Pa's and Pb's partial signatures, i.e. sa and rb, respectively. Disclosing sa and rh to P, does not affect the secrecy of r, and sb, respectively. This implies that PI does not have the 111 access to the exchanged signatures nor the contract document.
Limited role of the STTP (S3): The role of P, is limited to off-line signature recovery and issuing additional certificates to participating parties. P, need not store any information related to the shared secret key wbl, and P, does not have the access to the exchanged signatures and the contract document. Therefore, the security and storage requirements placed on PI are reduced.
Transparency of the STTP (S4): It is clear from the protocol description that the signatures recovered by P, are identical to those produced by the original signer.
Comparison with related work
In this section we evaluate the overheads introduced by the DSA-CS protocol and compare it with related VRESbased contract signing protocols suited for DSA signatures [3-5, 9, 13, 171. The evaluation and comparison are performed in terms of the number of messages specified in the protocols and computationally expensive operations (i.e. modular exponentiations) used in formation of all the messages. The results are shown in Table 1 .
Protocols [3-5, 91 differ fiom ours as they employ interactive ZK protocols for the VRES verification, which can be resource consuming. Therefore, our protocol is much more efficient and the amount of data transmitted is considerably smaller. Protocols [4, 51 are flawed as they allow party Pa to successfully launch the following attack Pa refuses to execute step (E3) and instead gets Pt to recover Pb's signature for him immediately after step (E2). In other words, they provide no condition under which P, will recover Pb's signature for Pa. Protocol [3] does not give the concrete instances of encryption algorithms used in the protocol, and therefore it is difficult to calculate the number of modular exponentiations and to evaluate it. However, the authors report that, only for the VRES verification, their protocol requires around 80 modular exponentiations and transmits around 4KB of data (when 40 interactive rounds are used in ZK proof), which greatly exceeds the number of exponentiations and amount of data transmitted during the execution of our entire exchange protocol (around 320 bytes). Protocols [3, 4, 9, 13, 171 do not provide contract and signatures' confidentiality, and in protocols [3, 131 both participants can be actively involved in dispute resolution. Authors of [ 171 have not presented the detailed protocol design, but rather have just explained the design of the VRES scheme the protocol is based on, which makes it difficult to evaluate the protocol itself. However, their VRES scheme has been recently broken and therefore the protocol is excluded from comparison.
* i is number of rounds in ZK proof. ** The concrete ZK proof of equality of discrete logarithms used in the protocol is not specified, e.g. using an efficient ZK proof fiom [8] the number of exponentiations for the VRES verification in [9] is 17 and for the exchange protocol is 26. *** There are two different recovery protocols for P, and P,,
Conclusion
The growing importance of e-commerce and the increasing number of applications in this area has led research into studying methods of how to perform contract signing over the Internet securely and reliably. This paper presented a novel, efficient and fair DSA-CS protocol to facilitate this e-commerce activity, in which the exchanged signatures are DSA-based. Automated dispute resolution in the protocol is performed with the help of an off-line and transparent STTP. The protocol analysis has demonstrated that it satisfies the security requirements specified, and that, in comparison with related protocols, it is more efficient. In our future work we will formally verify the protocol's security properties and prototype the protocol as part of the Fair Integrated Data Exchange System (FIDES).
